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Abstract. The present study empirically examines how voluntary International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption influences the earnings quality and the cost of debt 
of unlisted firms in Korea. Since 2011, when the adoption of IFRS by listed firms became 
mandatory, more unlisted firms have adopted IFRS voluntarily, improving the transpar-
ency and reliability of their accounting information. Using the sample of unlisted firms 
with 3year study period of pre- and post-IFRS adoption, we examine whether IFRS vol-
untary adopters show both lower discretionary accruals and the cost of debt than those of 
non adopters, and whether both discretionary accruals and the cost of debt of voluntary 
adopters decrease after IFRS adoption. We employ the Heckman’s two stage approach in 
order to avoid sample selection bias and cross sectional pooled OLS regression with or 
without clustering test. We complimentary report the results from firm-fixed effect panel 
model to generalise the results. The results show that firms which adopt IFRS have a 
higher earnings quality and a lower cost of debt that those which do not. These findings 
suggest that when unlisted firms issue bonds and borrow money, IFRS adoption contrib-
utes to decreasing the cost of debt.
Keywords: international financial reporting standards, earnings management, voluntary 
adoption, unlisted firm, cost of debt, accounting information, earnings quality, discretion-
ary accruals.
JEL Classification: M40, M41, M48, G30.
Introduction
Since 2011, when Korean listed firms first mandatorily adopted International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), the influence of this change in accounting standards 
has drawn considerable attention from business and academia alike. In particular, 
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researchers and practitioners have assessed how these newly adopted global accounting 
standards influence firm performance and how the capital market has responded to these 
changes (Auer 1996; Ball et al. 2003). Because IFRS focuses on the principles of fair 
value and economic substance, however, some temporary confusion may be expected, 
such as increased levels of judgment by accounting professionals and therefore a 
decrease in levels of comparability by firm and period. Furthermore, the adoption 
of IFRS in Korea is only mandatory for listed firms; unlisted firms are exempt from 
mandatory IFRS adoption and can still prepare their financial statements under Korea’s 
accounting standards (KGAAP hereafter). However, according to the recent report by 
the Financial Supervisory Service (2011)1, approximately 10% of unlisted firms in 
Korea have implemented IFRS voluntarily since 2009, when the Korean government 
allowed early adoption. The present study therefore empirically examines the effect on 
two financial indicators, namely earnings quality and the cost of debt, when unlisted 
firms voluntarily adopt IFRS compared with KGAAP. Although previous studies have 
examined the adoption of IFRS in Korea, they have tended to focus on early rather 
than voluntary adoption, and even then the limited sample sizes have made it hard for 
researchers to generalise the results. However, no studies have thus far analysed the 
factors that determine whether unlisted firms adopt IFRS voluntarily, which could also 
be influenced by the external environment. If IFRS adoption by unlisted firms improves 
the transparency and reliability of financial information, we could expect a positive effect 
on the Korean economy overall. We find that unlisted firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS 
show a higher earnings quality and a lower cost of debt than those adopting KGAAP. 
Firms report no change in earnings quality but a lower cost of debt after conversion to 
IFRS. These findings suggest that the main reasons for voluntarily adopting IFRS are a 
desire for consistency with the parent-listed company and an increase in the availability 
of long-term debt; thus such firms benefit from a lowering of their borrowing costs. The 
remainder of the present paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is a review of previous 
studies of IFRS adoption. Section 3 contains the research design and sample selection 
procedure, and formulates some hypotheses. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical 
results, and in the last Section we present some conclusions and limitations.
1. Literature review
Few studies have used primary research methods, including surveys, to investigate 
the factors that drive firms to adopt IFRS early. In this vein, Ashbaugh (2001) 
investigated non-US firms listed on the London stock market, while Kim and Kang 
(2010) researched listed firms that adopted IFRS early in Korea. Ashbaugh’s study 
(2001) of non-US firms listed on the London stock market examined the motivating 
factors for their choice of IFRS or USGAAP as opposed to the accounting standards 
of their respective countries. The author reported that the sample firms chose IFRS 
when their stocks were traded on overseas stock markets, when they needed to provide 
1 Press release from Financial Supervisory Service (http://www.etnews.com/news/economy/econo-
my/2497255_1493.html).
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standardised information, or when they planned paid-in capital increases. According to 
Kim and Kang (2010), listed firms were early adopters of IFRS in order to improve the 
reliability of their financial statements, to improve their financial structure, and to file 
consolidated financial statements. In studying the effectiveness of IFRS, most authors 
have examines earnings quality or asymmetric information in order to understand 
whether the adoption of IFRS is suitable and what effect it has. For example, Barth, 
Landsman and Lang (2008) found that the earnings quality of firms that adopted IFRS 
is higher than that of non-adopters. A number of authors have found an improvement 
in earnings quality, including Gordon et al. (2009), Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011), and Barth et al. (2012). By contrast, others found no improvement in their 
earnings quality (Christensen et al. 2008; Capkun et al. 2011). While Yeo, Koh and 
Kim (2007) and Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) suggested that each country that has 
adopted IFRS has shown different effects on earnings management, including some 
cases of increased earnings. In terms of information asymmetry, Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) and Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) found that IFRS adoption decreases investors’ 
information asymmetry. Hail et al. (2010) reported increasing liquidity and a lowering 
of the cost of capital via a reduction in information asymmetry according to the IFRS. 
Further, Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) showed that this information asymmetry 
decreases the cost of capital and increases firm value. Recently, Brochet et al. (2013) 
focused on the comparability of financial statements following the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS and found an improvement in terms of comparability and capital market 
benefits. They suggested that the cause of this improved comparability stems from the 
reduction of the ability of insiders to access private information. Some authors reported 
improvements in the forecasting environment affecting financial analysts, in terms of its 
accuracy or coverage, for example (Tan et al. 2011; Horton et al. 2013). Some studies 
showed positive capital market consequences after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, 
including positive abnormal returns during the transitory period of IFRS (Armstrong 
et al. 2010) and increases in the informativeness of stock prices (Beuselinck et al. 2009). 
At the same time, however, Kim (2011) found no significant differences in information 
asymmetry (and earnings quality) between early and late adopters in Korea. Christensen, 
Hail, and Leuz (2013) argued that capital market effects could be mixed with changes in 
enforcement given a lack of evidence of market liquidity in IFRS countries. Based on 
this inconclusive evidence, Kang, Han and Hwang (2009) claimed that it is necessary 
first to examine the previous accounting environment, the social and cultural traditions 
of a country, industry or individual firm, as well as any previous accounting standards, 
in order to analyse earnings differences between pre- and post-IFRS adoption. Because 
all Korean studies of IFRS implementation have investigated early adopters, they 
have suffered from the drawback of limited samples of firms, which could have led 
to inconsistent and ungeneralisable results. By contrast, the target firms in our present 
research are unlisted firms in Korea, which outnumber listed ones by a factor of ten to 
one. Of these, an estimated 842 unlisted firms have adopted IFRS voluntarily. Therefore, 
in the present paper we use this sample to analyse the factors that drive voluntary IFRS 
adoption and empirically examine the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings quality and 
the cost of debt.
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2. Hypothesis development and research design
2.1. Factors that drive IFRS adoption by unlisted firms
Unlike listed firms in Korea, unlisted enterprises are not obliged to adopt IFRS, but 
some do so voluntarily. First we present Model 1, which analyses the factors that drive 
voluntary IFRS adoption by unlisted firms based on the motivating factors for listed 
firms in the literature (Ashbaugh 2001; Kim, Kang 2010). The characteristics of listed 
firms that adopt IFRS voluntarily can be summarised as high performance, low debt 
ratio, large firm size, extra funds (e.g., an increase in long-term liabilities and paid-in 
capital increases), and cross-listings in more than two countries (Hung, Subramanyam 
2007; Harris, Muller 1999). By using all these variables except cross-listing, we 
construct Model 1 as follows:
[Model 1] 
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 (1)
where IFRSit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i adopts IFRS in year t and 0 
otherwise. ROAit: Return on assets of firm i in year t (Earnings before Tax/Total Assets). 
LEVit: Debt ratio of firm i in year t (Total Debt/Total Assets). PPEit: Fixed asset ratio 
of firm i in year t (Property, plant, and equipment/Total Assets). SIZEit: Natural log 
of assets of firm i in year t. L_DEBTit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the long-term 
liabilities of firm i increase in year t and 0 otherwise. SUBit: Dummy variable that equals 
1 if firm i is included in the 30 largest business groups in year t and 0 otherwise. IPOit: 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i in year t is pre-IPO and 0 otherwise.
This step is a necessary proactive process to examine the sample population in this 
study. In other words, this process ensures that the results are free from sample selec-
tion bias by excluding the characteristics of those firms that adopted IFRS voluntarily 
in order to verify the effectiveness of IFRS adoption. 
2.2. Changes in the earnings quality of unlisted firms after adopting IFRS
The results of previous studies of IFRS adoption and earnings quality depend on the 
countries, industries and firms analysed (Cuijpers, Buijink 2005; Gassen, Sellhorn 2006; 
Covrig et al. 2007). However, by expanding the scope of these studies and using capital 
book value as a proxy for earnings quality, Barth et al. (2008) found that those firms 
that adopted IFRS had higher earnings quality than those that did not, after analysing 
earnings management, timely loss recognition and the value coherence of accounting 
earnings. Further, Kim (2011) showed that the earnings quality of those listed firms 
that had adopted IFRS early improved thereafter. In this context, we contend that the 
earnings quality of unlisted firms rises after the voluntary adoption of IFRS, leading to 
the formulation of the following two hypotheses:
H1-1: Ceteris paribus, the earnings quality of unlisted firms that adopt IFRS is higher
          than that of unlisted firms that adopt KGAAP;
H1-2: Ceteris paribus, after adopting IFRS the earnings quality of unlisted firms is 
           higher than before IFRS adoption.
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In methodological terms, this study uses Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model in order 
to remove sample selection bias. We therefore examine the effectiveness of voluntary 
IFRS adoption by unlisted firms after controlling for the factors that drive its adoption, 
as confirmed in Section 2.1. We then analyse changes in earnings quality after adoption 
and compare earnings quality with that of firms using KGAAP.
[Model 2]
Stage 1: [Model 1] from 2.1.
Stage 2:
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where DAit: Discretionary accruals of firm i in year t estimated by the modified Jones 
model. IFRSit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i adopts IFRS in year t and 0 
otherwise. Post_IFRSit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i adopts IFRS after year 
t and 0 otherwise. BIG4it: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs 
to the Big4 auditors and 0 otherwise. Millsit: Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of 
Model 1. ΣI_Dumit: Industry dummy. ΣY_Dumit: Year dummy.
We use cross-sectional analysis by industry and year in order to estimate discretionary 
accruals. The modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005) is as follows. Discretionary 
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where TAit: Total accruals of firm i in year t (Net income – Operating cash flow). 
Ait–1: Total assets of firm i in year t-1. ΔREVit: Changes in the sales of firm i in year t 
(Salest – Salest–1). ΔRECit: Changes in the receivables of firm i in year t (Receivablest – 
Receivablest–1). PPEit: Property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t (except land 
and construction).
2.3. Changes in the cost of debt of unlisted firms after adopting IFRS
Leuz and Verrecchia’s (2000) study of German firms found that firms which adopt 
IFRS or USGAAP benefited from a decrease in asymmetric information compared 
with those that implemented German accounting standards, which then resulted in a 
decreased cost of debt. Similarly, Daske et al. (2008) showed that increased information 
asymmetry affects the cost of capital and firm value. These authors also reported that 
IFRS adoption increases market liquidity, decreases the cost of capital and increases 
firm value. In particular, voluntary IFRS adopters had a far greater influence on the 
capital market than firms that adopted these standards mandatorily. Moreover, previous 
studies have consistently shown that IFRS adoption improves disclosure standards, 
thereby decreasing the cost of capital, with voluntary adopters showing even greater 
decreases in this regard. Further, Yang, Lee and Yoon (2011) reported that if accounting 
disclosure was expanded and its quality improved, asymmetric information could be 
decreased further, which could serve as a low risk premium, resulting in a decreased 
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cost of debt. Market information on unlisted firms can be limited, however, implying a 
high information risk. In this case, if unlisted firms adopt IFRS voluntarily and increase 
the quality of accounting disclosure, information asymmetry will reduce, as will the cost 
of debt in the long run, leading to the next two hypotheses:
H2-1: Ceteris paribus, the cost of debt for unlisted firms that adopt IFRS is less than 
          that for unlisted firms that adopt K-GAAP;
H2-2: Ceteris paribus, the cost of debt for unlisted firms after adopting IFRS is lower 
          than that before IFRS adoption.
[Model 3]
Stage 1: [Model 1] from 2.1.
Stage 2: 
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  (4)
where C_DEBT1it: Interest rate of firm i in year t (Interest expenses/Average debt). 
C_DEBT2it: Fractional rank variable based on C_DEBT1 of firm i in year t (five groups). 
PPEit: Fixed asset ratio of firm i in year t (Property, plant, and equipment/Total Assets). 
GRWit: Growth rate of firm i in year t (Change in sales/Opening assets). NEGEit: Dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm’s total equity is below its capital and 0 otherwise.
In Model 3, the principal variable is interest rate (C_DEBT1), which is calculated as 
aggregated interest expenses in year t divided by average short- and long-term debt at 
the beginning and end of each fiscal year (Pittman, Fortin 2004; Francis et al. 2005a, 
2005b). Rank variable based on the interest rate (C_DEBT2) is used to alleviate the ef-
fects of extreme observation that continuous variable might have (Francis et al. 2004, 
2005a; Kim, Sohn 2009). These also generalize the main results. The control variables 
are those reported as determining factors in the cost of capital by previous studies and 
those that characterise unlisted firms (Khurana, Raman 2004; Pittman, Fortin 2004; 
Ahmed et al. 2008; Fernando et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2008; Lou, Vasvari 2009; Hope 
et al. 2009; Kim, Park 2010; McInnis 2010; Ge, Kim 2010; Kim et al. 2011).
2.4. Sample selection
We selected firms unlisted on the Korean stock exchange from 2009 to 2011. We 
excluded financial institutions because of their different accounting rules and materials 
compared with nonfinancial industries. Further, we restricted the sample to firms having 
a fiscal year ending in December for comparability purposes, and also excluded the top 
and bottom 1% of firms from the final sample. Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample 
selection process, while Panel B and Panel C indicate the sample distribution by time 
and industry. Our final sample comprised 33,869 firm-year observations. We collected 
financial data through TS-2000 and KIS-VALUE III2. We ran cross-sectional pooled 
2 Total Solution 2000 by Korea Companies Information and KIS-VALUE III at NICE Information 
Service.
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regressions with OLS and complimentary reported the estimates from firm-fixed effect 
models, as discussed in the sensitivity analysis section. In addition, because the present 
study aims to verify unlisted firms empirically, this analysis can be affected by cluster 
or cross-sectional dependence between firms. In this case, the t value of the regression 
coefficients can be shown to be bigger than their actual values, thereby exaggerating 
the result (Petersen 2009). Therefore, adding clustering verification and ascertaining 
consistent results from the OLS regression analysis can add robustness to the results. 
Table 1. Sample selection
Panel A: Process of sample selection
Unlisted firms (fiscal year ending in December)
2009 2010 2011 Total
17,172 18,357 16,781 52,310
Missing data on financial variables (6,077) (6,480) (4,369) (16,926)
Financial institutions (3) (3) (5) (11)
Extremes* (473) (503) (528) (1,504)
Final sample 10,619 11,371 11,879 33,869
Panel B: Time distribution
Year Frequency % Cumulative %
2009 10,619 31.35 31.35
2010 11,371 33.57 64.92
2011 11,879 35.08 100
Total 33,869 100
Panel C: Industry distribution
Industry Frequency % Cum. frequency Cumulative %
Manufacturing 19,099 56.39 19,099 56.39
Construction 3,199 9.45 22,298 65.84
Wholesale and retail 4,490 13.26 26,788 79.09
Transportation 739 2.18 27,527 81.27
Real estate and leasing 1,985 5.86 29,512 87.14
Service 4,115 12.15 33,627 99.29
Others 242 0.71 33,869 100
Total 33,869 100
Notes: Industry classification is based on the one-digit classification in KIS-VALUE III of the NICE 
Group (National Information and Credit Evaluation Inc.). *We deleted the top and bottom 1% of the 
samples as extremes.
Panel A of Table 1 shows that manufacturing accounts for approximately 56% of the 
sample, indicating that most of the firms that form the backbone of Korea’s manufactur-
ing industry are unlisted.




Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the present study. DA in 
Panel A is the variable that represents earnings quality, and its mean and median values 
are –0.006 and –0.001, respectively. During the period, the interest rate (C_DEBT1) 
of each firm is approximately 6.1% on average. Panel B divides the sample into five 
groups according to the size of the interest rate (C_DEBT1). The highest average interest 
rate is approximately 9.9%, while the interest rates of the firms that adopt IFRS and 
KGAAP are 5.9% and 6.1%, respectively (Panel C). Less than 1% (n = 265) of the 
unlisted firms in our sample are defined herein as large businesses (SUB = 0.00782). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Full sample
Total sample (N = 33,869) Mean Std. dev 1Q Median 3Q
DA 0.0061 0.1454 –0.0567 0.0041 0.0641
C_DEBT1 0.0250 0.0262 0.0092 0.0234 0.0379
IFRS 0.0225 0.1483 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
SIZE 17.04 0.7958 16.46 16.83 17.42
ROA 0.0273 0.1132 0.0046 0.0273 0.0676
LEV 0.6613 0.4523 0.5035 0.6698 0.8052
PPE 0.2108 0.1823 0.0723 0.1677 0.2996
GRW 0.1569 0.5642 –0.0360 0.0796 0.3072
Panel B: Group sample by fractional rank variable (C_DEBT2)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
DA 0.0086 0.0065 0.0085 0.0043 0.0025
C_DEBT1 –0.0076 0.0125 0.0233 0.0342 0.0628
IFRS 0.0283 0.0256 0.0202 0.0186 0.0197
SIZE 17.06 17.05 17.02 17.01 17.02
ROA 0.0404 0.0328 0.0255 0.0200 0.0177
LEV 0.6155 0.6247 0.6802 0.6966 0.6893
PPE 0.2123 0.2352 0.2235 0.2130 0.1698
GRW 0.1584 0.1565 0.1609 0.1686 0.1398
NEGE 0.1522 0.1009 0.1079 0.1218 0.1345
BIG4 0.1771 0.1663 0.1634 0.1484 0.1448
L_DEBT 0.4850 0.4897 0.4809 0.4747 0.4753
SUB 0.0093 0.0068 0.0066 0.0081 0.0061
N 6,773 6,774 6,774 6,774 6,774
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Moreover, these unlisted firms file consolidated financial statements with their listed 
parent firms; it is therefore likely that they adopted IFRS voluntarily because their 
parent firms adopted IFRS mandatorily.
In Panel C,We find that IFRS and non-IFRS firms show significant differences in most 
variables. IFRS firms show significantly lower interest rates (C_DEBT1) at the 1% level 
Panel C: IFRS firms vs. KGAAP firms
Variables IFRS KGAAP Difference t-value
DA –0.012 –0.006 –0.006 –1.28
C_DEBT1 0.059 0.061 –0.002 –2.34**
SIZE 17.92 17.03 0.887 23.94***
ROA 0.035 0.015 0.020 4.30***
LEV 0.586 0.693 –0.107 –9.67***
PPE 0.242 0.206 0.036 4.57***
GRW 0.255 0.114 0.141 6.22***
NEGE 0.166 0.177 –0.010 –0.74
BIG4 0.717 0.170 0.547 32.52***
L_DEBT 0.599 0.453 0.146 7.93***
SUB 0.058 0.007 0.051 5.89***
N 728 33,141
Panel D: Pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
Variables Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Difference t-value
DA –0.003 –0.012 –0.009 –1.29
C_DEBT1 0.064 0.057 –0.007 –4.79***
SIZE 17.752 17.915 0.163 3.51***
ROA 0.036 0.034 –0.001 –0.21
LEV 0.590 0.586 –0.004 –0.30
PPE 0.236 0.242 0.005 0.56
GRW 0.235 0.255 0.019 0.70
NEGE 0.183 0.166 –0.016 –0.93
BIG4 0.608 0.717 0.109 5.02***
N 1,221 728
Notes: DA: Discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones model, C_DEBT1: Interest 
rate (Interest expenses/Average debt), C_DEBT2: Fractional rank variable based on C_DEBT1, SIZE: 
Natural log of assets, ROA: Return on assets, LEV: Debt ratio, PPE: Fixed asset ratio (Property, plant, 
and equipment/Total Assets), GRW: Growth rate (Change in sales/Opening assets), NEGE: Dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a firm has impaired capital and 0 otherwise, BIG4: Dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs to the Big4 auditors and 0 otherwise, L_DEBT: Dummy variable 
that equals 1 if long-term liabilities increase and 0 otherwise, SUB: Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
a firm is included in the 30 largest business groups and 0 otherwise.
End of Table 2
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as well as higher values in terms of firm size (SIZE), return on assets (ROA), fixed asset 
ratio (PPE), and growth rate (GRW) compared with non-IFRS firms. We also find that 
interest rates (C_DEBT1) post-adoption are lower than during the pre-adoption period 
(Panel D). Table 3 shows the correlations among the variables. IFRS adoption and earn-
ings quality show a negative correlation (–0.006; not significant), while IFRS adoption 
and interest rate have a significant negative correlation (–0.01, 5% level). IFRS adoption 
also shows positive correlations with firm size (SIZE), return on assets (ROA), fixed 
asset ratio (PPE) and growth rate (GRW) all at the 1% significance level. 
Table 3. Correlations
IFRS DA C_DEBT1 SIZE ROA LEV PPE GRW NEGE
IFRS –0.006 –0.01** 0.15† 0.02† –0.04† 0.027† 0.03† –0.004
DA –0.03† 0.05† 0.41† –0.20† –0.02† 0.07† –0.17†
C_DEBT1 –0.04† –0.03† 0.03† 0.017† –0.03† 0.04†
SIZE 0.12† –0.12† –0.03† 0.08† –0.12†
ROA –0.45† –0.09† 0.19† –0.36†




Notes: *, ** and † indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance in two-tailed tests, respectively. 
See Table 2 for the definition of the variables.
3.2. Results of IFRS vs KGAAP
Table 4 presents the results obtained from testing H1, namely whether earnings quality 
and the cost of debt of unlisted firms that adopt IFRS is higher or lower, respectively, 
than those of unlisted KGAAP firms. Panel A of Table 4 reports the driving factors 
behind voluntary IFRS adoption from the first stage results of Heckman’s two-stage 
approach. The panel shows that all variables except return on assets (ROA) and initial 
public offering (IPO) influence unlisted firms to adopt IFRS voluntarily. In other words, 
firms that have lower debt ratios, higher fixed asset ratios and larger sizes are more 
likely to adopt IFRS voluntarily. Further, because long-term liabilities (L_DEBT) play 
an important role in adopting IFRS voluntarily, we can assume that bond issue and long-
term debt procurement are other motivating factors. Finally, if the firm is a subsidiary of 
a large business (SUB), it is also more likely to adopt IFRS. Next, Panel B presents the 
results of the empirical analysis after controlling for the characteristics of IFRS adopters 
confirmed in stage 1. The first column shows the results in terms of changes in earnings 
quality, while the second and third columns show the changes in the cost of debt using 
interest rate and fractional rank of interest rate. The correlation between IFRS adoption 
and earnings quality (DA) is significantly negative (–0.012 at the 5% level). This finding 
Y. H. Lee et al. The effect of voluntary IFRS adoption by unlisted firms on earnings quality ...
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implies that firms adopting IFRS have higher earnings quality than KGAAP firms3. The 
results for the remaining control variables are consistent with those of previous studies 
(Xie et al. 2003; Defond, Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow et al. 1995; Becker et al. 1998; 
Yoon 1998; Choi, Choe 2003; Francis, Krishnan 1999). That is, earnings quality (DA) 
is higher (lower) for a bigger size, a lower return on assets, lower leverage, and in the 
big 4. Overall, the results are consistent with prior research findings that suggest that 
the adoption of IFRS is associated with higher earnings quality, and H1-1 is supported 
(e.g., Ashbaugh, Pincus 2001; Barth et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2009). The cost of debt 
is not significantly correlated with IFRS adoption when using interest rate4 as a proxy, 
but it does show a significantly negative correlation with IFRS adoption when using the 
fractional rank variable (0.183 at the 1% significance level). This finding suggests that 
unlisted firms which adopt IFRS voluntarily have a lower cost of debt than KGAAP 
firms. In other words, the voluntary adoption of IFRS in unlisted firms shows the same 
effects as mandatory adoption in terms of capital market benefits (Daske et al. 2008; 
Hail et al. 2010; Leuz, Verrecchia 2000). Thus, H2-1 is supported.
Table 4. Regression analysis 
Panel A: First stage: Probit model
            Dep.V 
Indep.V 
IFRS
Coefficient Wald Chi-square Pr > ChiSq Standardised Estimate
Intercept –8.558 729.8 <.0001
ROA –0.178 1.153 0.283 –0.029
LEV –0.417 34.94 <.0001 –0.179
PPE 0.280 9.619 0.0019 0.054
SIZE 0.394 501.7 <.0001 0.330
L_DEBT 0.189 31.67 <.0001 0.094
SUB 0.335 10.69 0.0011 0.030
IPO –1.653 0.001 0.9781 –0.009
Likelihood Ratio 876.90***
–2 Log L 7031
N 33,869
Notes: IFRS: Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise, IPO: Dummy 
variable that equals 1 if year t is pre-IPO and 0 otherwise. See Table2 for the definition of the other 
variables.
 
3 The lower value of DA means higher earnings quality.
4 We also alternatively use an interest rate spread calculated as the difference between the interest 
rate on each firm’s debt and the national and public bond interest rate with the same expiration. This 
proxy represents the additional interest rate that firms must pay additionally to the interest rate for 
their loans. The results are qualitatively similar.
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Panel B: Second stage: OLS regression results of IFRS firms vs. non-IFRS firms and OLS 
regression results of IFRS firms after IFRS adoption
           Dep.V
Indep.V
IFRS firms vs. non-IFRS firms IFRS firms after IFRS adoption
DA C_DEBT1 C_DEBT2 DA C_DEBT1 C_DEBT2







































































































Adj R-Sq 0.179 0.004 0.094 0.023 0.129 0.178
F Value 570.57*** 10.94*** 237.7*** 4.47*** 20.22*** 29.09***
N 33,869 1,949
Notes: Post_IFRSit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i adopts IFRS after year t and 0 otherwise. 
See Table 2 for the definition of the other variables. Millsit: Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage 
of Model 1, I_Dum: Industry dummy variables, Y_Dum: Year dummy variables. See Table 2 for the 
definition of the other variables.
3.3. Results of pre and post IFRS
Table 5 presents the changes in earnings quality and the cost of debt for IFRS firms 
before and after adoption after controlling for the characteristics of IFRS adopters in 
Panel A of Table 4. Earnings quality (DA) shows no significant differences between pre- 
and post-adoption (–0.015), whereas the cost of debt decreases significantly after IFRS 
End of Table 4
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adoption. Interest rate also shows marginal decrease at the 10% level, and the result 
using the fractional rank variables shows significant decreases at the 5% level (–0.417). 
This is consistent with the findings of previous studies that IFRS grants managers a 
significant amount of discretion in their application, and as a result the earnings quality 
that results from the new standards either shows no improvement or is lower than before 
(e.g., Christensen et al. 2008; Capkun et al. 2011). Nevertheless the cost of debt is still 
affected by IFRS adoption, being generally reduced (Daske et al. 2008; Hail et al. 2010; 
Leuz, Verrecchia 2000). Therefore, when unlisted firms are sensitive to the cost of debt 
as their main source of funds, voluntarily IFRS adoption decreases the interest rate, 
which reduces the cost of debt. Thus, H1-2 is rejected and H2-2 is supported.
Table 5. OLS regression results of IFRS firms after IFRS adoption
























































Adj R-Sq 0.023 0.129 0.178
F Value 4.47*** 20.22*** 29.09***
N 1,949
Notes: Post_IFRSit: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i adopts IFRS after year t and 0 otherwise. 
See Table 2 for the definition of the other variables.
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The financial data on the sampled unlisted firms in this study may suffer from a firm-
level clustering problem and we adjusted the OLS standard errors by firm-level cluster 
in order to check the robustness of our results. In an untabulated analysis, we found the 
results considering clustering are qualitatively similar to the main results, confirming 
that our results are not biased by clustering. Also we tested the sensitivity of our results 
to an econometric model which uses firm-level unbalanced panel data5. We re-estimated 
the cross-sectional analysis using firm-fixed effects and eliminated time-invariant 
unobserved firm attributes as potentially confounding factors. The results are consistent 
and the inferences are therefore the same as for our main results.
Conclusions
In this study we examined the financial implications for unlisted firms in Korea of 
adopting IFRS voluntarily, and quantified the changes following IFRS adoption by 
assessing the proxies of earning quality and the cost of debt. Because IFRS adoption 
is mandatory only for listed firms in Korea, the implications of IFRS adoption by 
unlisted firms is under-researched. This research therefore contributes to the body of 
knowledge on this topic by confirming the motivating factors that lie behind unlisted 
firms’ voluntary adoption of IFRS and analysing the effects of IFRS adoption. Because 
unlisted firms can choose between two accounting standards, most apply KGAAP due 
to the higher cost of using IFRS. However, the results presented herein confirm that 
unlisted firms in Korea benefit from IFRS adoption via a lower cost of debt. This finding 
is not only of practical relevance for firms that plan to adopt IFRS but may also provide 
a useful argument for promoting the benefits of adoption. Moreover, we showed that 
firms adopting IFRS have higher earnings quality compared with firms that use KGAAP. 
The approximately 18,000 unlisted firms in Korea are important economic units in 
the growth of Korean industry. If they all adopted IFRS voluntarily, a considerable 
proportion of the financial information on the main production units in Korea’s capital 
market would acquire more transparency and higher credibility, thereby mitigating the 
negative image of Korea discount. This paper is based on the proxy of earnings quality 
that is estimated from model, and thus subject to any biases embedded in the model. 
But out results provide new information that may stimulate further research on the 
credit evaluation of unlisted firms as well as loan appraisals by financial institutes for 
unlisted firms. Finally, given the lack of studies of unlisted firms compared with listed 
ones, these results improve our understanding of unlisted firms in general and may help 
guide future studies of this type.
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DA: Discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones model  
(Kothari et al. 2005)
C_DEBT1: Interest rate (Interest expenses/Average debt)
C_DEBT2: Fractional rank variable based on C_DEBT1 (five groups)
Independant variables
IFRS: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm adopts IFRS and 0 otherwise
Post_IFRS: Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm adopts IFRS after year t and 0 otherwise
SIZE: Natural log of total assets
ROA: Return on assets (Earnings before Tax/Total Assets)
LEV: Debt ratio (Total Debt/Total Assets)
BIG4: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs to the Big4 auditors 
and 0 otherwise
PPE: Fixed asset ratio (Property, plant, and equipment/Total Assets)
GRW: Growth rate (Change in sales/Opening assets)
NEGE: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s total equity is below its capital  
and 0 otherwise
Mills: Inverse Mills Ratio from the first stage of Model 1
ΣI_Dum: Industry dummy variables
ΣY_Dum: Year dummy variables
Note: This table provides definitions of the variables that were used in this study. Data were obtained 
from TS-2000 and KIS-VALUE III.
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